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ASSESSING THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF BUDGETARY POLICY: 
THE ROLE OF BENCHMARKS AND INDEXATION 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the potential role for increasing social welfare rates, along 
with tax credits and bands, in line with price or wage inflation – a process known 
as indexation. Ireland currently has a default policy of no increases in line with 
inflation, with ad hoc changes instead announced on Budget day. The recent 
‘Pensions Roadmap’ commits to ‘a process whereby future changes in pension 
rates of payment are explicitly linked to changes in the consumer price index and 
average wages’, and the Minister for Employment Affairs and Social Protection has 
also announced the intention to examine an index-linked system for the wider 
welfare system. In light of these discussions, the paper examines how Ireland 
compares to other countries with regard to indexation. It also examines the impact 
that different indexation options have on income inequality and poverty over time. 
Both nominal freezes in taxes and social welfare rates and increases in line with 
price inflation result in an increase in poverty and income inequality in the longer 
run. Indexation in line with wage inflation, however, helps keep poverty rates and 
income inequality more constant in the longer run. Indexation would, of course, 
represent a cost to the Exchequer – for Budget 2020 we estimate that indexation 
of the tax-benefit system would cost in the region of €462 million, while indexation 
in line with average wage increases would cost in excess of €1.2 billion.  
1 INTRODUCTION  
Governments make two kinds of choices about budgetary policy. They decide what 
is the default policy1 if no budgetary adjustment is made, and they decide on 
Budget day adjustments relative to that default. A great deal of attention is paid to 
the announced policy changes, but much less attention is given to the default 
policies.2 
In this paper we clarify the role played by these default policies, which vary across 
countries and over time. We examine the implications of alternative default 
policies for real incomes at different income levels, for inequality and poverty, and 
for the Exchequer. We then turn to a distinct issue, informed by the analyses of 
alternative forms of indexation: the choice of a benchmark against which to assess 
the distributional impact of budgetary policy. Are governments’ default policies – 
such as Ireland’s nominal freeze, or the UK’s mixture of price indexation for most 
                                                          
1  We use the term ‘default policy’ to refer to whatever indexation rule – or lack of rules – apply in the absence of an 
explicit budgetary policy change. 
2  In the Irish fiscal landscape, the default policies construct what is termed the ‘opening budget’.  
2 
tax and welfare benefits,3 with a ‘triple lock’ on the basic pension – suitable as a 
benchmark? Or is a benchmark that is independent of governments’ choice of 
default policy better suited to this role? We examine the issues involved and argue 
that an independent benchmark that is neutral in distributional terms is preferable. 
We also explore the longer-run evolution of policies measured against such an 
independent benchmark, drawing on results from Ireland and a number of other 
EU countries.4 
The Pensions Roadmap (Government of Ireland, 2018) commits to the 
development of proposals that will ‘institute a process whereby future changes in 
pension rates of payment are explicitly linked to changes in the consumer price 
index and average wages’, with a ‘formal benchmark target of 34% of average 
earnings for State Pension contributory payments’. The Minister for Employment 
Affairs and Social Protection has also recently discussed plans to examine aligning 
social welfare rate increases with a particular index (Bray, 2019). The issues we 
examine are highly relevant in this context.  
Related issues arise with respect to the adjustment of indirect taxes, which are 
defined in terms of monetary amounts per specific quantity (e.g. duties on alcohol, 
tobacco and petrol). We consider these issues and suggest that indexation of these 
taxes in line with broader price inflation provides an appropriate benchmark. We 
examine the costs of indexation in line with prices, or with wages, in the context of 
Budget 2020. How much of the nominal ‘fiscal space’ would be required simply to 
index tax and welfare parameters, to ensure a distributionally neutral budget? Our 
estimates take account of the costs of indexing for income taxes and welfare, but 
also the Exchequer gains from indexing relevant indirect taxes. Finally, we examine 
the distributional impact of failing to index the tax-benefit system. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we examine the default policy 
adjustments that have commonly been adopted by governments, and their 
implications for the distribution of income and for the Exchequer. Section 3 
examines the choice of a benchmark or standard against which to measure 
the distributional impact of a government’s year-to-year policy changes. It also 
examines some recent evidence on the overall impact of policy changes on the 
distribution of income for a range of European countries over the medium term 
and compares this with some results for Ireland over a longer period. The issue 
of ensuring indexation of the tax-benefit system as a whole is examined in 
Section 4. In section 5 we examine some selected issues regarding indexation. 
The costs and distributional impact of alternative indexation strategies 
are estimated in Section 6, in the context of Budget 2020. The key findings are 
drawn together in Section 7. 
3 Price indexation means that benefits are frozen in real terms – as is the case for working-age benefits in the UK until 
2020. 
4 Our focus throughout is on households, in terms of taxes, welfare payments and net incomes; issues relating to 
corporate taxes and the impact on firms are not within the remit of this paper. 
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2 THE ROLE OF DEFAULT POLICIES FOR TAX AND WELFARE UPRATING 
There is wide variation in the default policies for year-to-year adjustment of tax 
and benefit policies along several dimensions. The starting point for many 
countries – including Ireland – has been that policy changes are announced on a 
discretionary basis, year by year: no systematic uprating rule is applied. However, 
the experience of high wage-price inflation during the 1970s and early 1980s led 
to changes in this procedure in a number of countries. One of the driving forces for 
this was the phenomenon known as ‘fiscal drag’ or ‘bracket creep’, i.e. high growth 
in nominal wages without concomitant increases in tax bands, leading to a higher 
proportion of income being taxed at higher rates.5 Buchanan’s writings on public 
choice theory (see Reisman, 1989 for a useful overview) identify this as facilitating 
a ‘stealth tax’, with the average tax rate rising. Heinemann’s (2001) empirical 
analysis confirms that higher inflation is associated with higher average tax rates. 
A key point is that there is a parallel issue in relation to social security and social 
welfare payments. If benefit payment rates do not keep pace with price inflation, 
welfare recipients experience losses of real income. When, as has usually been the 
case, nominal wage growth is faster than price inflation, there are similar issues in 
terms of relative income: if benefit rates do not keep pace with growth in real 
incomes, then the incomes of those dependent on welfare fall in relation to 
average living standards. Paulus et al. (2019) term this ‘benefit erosion’.  
In what follows, we illustrate the substantial differences in uprating or indexation 
policies across countries, over time, and as between tax and benefit instruments. 
2.1 Variation across countries 
Sutherland et al. (2008) provide an overview of the tax and welfare uprating 
procedures (or lack of procedures) across a wide range of countries.6 Drawing on 
this work, we can illustrate the great variety of the approaches then in force, 
including the following. 
Denmark: 
 Uprating is unified and comprehensive.
 All benefit and tax parameters are systematically indexed with respect to
average earnings – with a small lag, and a small deduction.
5 In fact, in the calculation of fiscal space the government counts the non-indexation of the tax system as a revenue-
raising measure: see IFAC (2018). 
6 We focus here on the scale of adjustment to money-valued welfare and tax parameters. Sutherland et al. (2008) 
document a range of other differences in the adjustment procedures, including the legal basis (automatic or at the 
initiative of government), coverage (full system or selected elements) and the role of the political process (statutory 
provision with the possibility of suspension, versus no legal provision but regular de facto adjustment). 
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Finland:  
 The basic means-tested pension, family benefits and minimum income scheme 
are indexed in line with price inflation. 
 By contrast, earnings-related pensions are linked to a weighted average of 
price inflation (80% weight) and wage growth (20% weight). 
 Income tax parameters are adjusted on a discretionary basis, with frequent de 
facto adjustment. 
Sweden: 
 Most benefits are adjusted in line with prices. 
 Earnings-related pensions are linked to average earnings growth less 1.6%, so 
typically are growing in real terms but falling in relation to average incomes. 
Australia: 
 Most benefits are indexed in line with price inflation. 
 Income tax thresholds are changed through discretionary procedures. 
 The means-tested old age pension also has provision for a link to the consumer 
price index (CPI), but the lower limit of 25% of average weekly earnings has 
been the driving force instead. 
New Zealand: 
 Most benefits are linked to CPI. 
 Pension (NZ Superannuation) follows CPI, but subject to a floor of 65 per cent 
and a ceiling of 72.5 per cent of average earnings. 
Sutherland et al (2008) summarise the situation with respect to these and other 
countries in their study: 
Besides a very few examples of automatic and unified earnings uprating, the most 
common practice remains adjustment linked to prices … When uprating is to some 
extent linked to earnings, this is limited to pension payments, while the rest of the 
tax-benefit system parameters are linked to price movements. 
De Agostini et al. (2014) note that in many EU countries, indexation rules were 
changed – typically in a less generous direction – as austerity policies were 
introduced following the Great Recession. This provides further evidence on 
temporal as well as cross-national variations. 
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TABLE 1 INDEXATION REGIMES FOR MANDATORY EARNINGS-RELATED PENSIONS 
 Indexation regime Countries 
No automatic indexation, discretionary changes only Austria 
Price indexation Belgium, Canada, France, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Korea, Poland, Turkey, USA 
Weighted average or other combination of price 
indexation and indexation with respect to wage or 
income changes 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Japan, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Switzerland 
Wage indexation Germany,* Netherlands,* Norway, Slovenia, 
Sweden 
Source:  OECD (2017), Table 3.6 
Note:  * The change is conditional on financial sustainability in this country. Japan: wage indexation to age 67, followed by price
indexation thereafter. Norway: indexation to wage growth minus 0.75%. Sweden: wage growth minus 1.6%. 
While pensions are often treated differently from other benefits, there is also very 
substantial variation across countries in the uprating procedures for pension 
benefits. We illustrate this using information on the uprating procedures for 
mandatory, earnings-related pension schemes in OECD countries. Even within this 
specific type of pension scheme, there is considerable cross-country variation. 
Some countries opt for price indexation, others for wage indexation, while a 
substantial number provide for uprating that takes the form of a combination 
(often a weighted average) of price and wage developments. 
2.2 Variation across time 
The experience of high inflation, as noted earlier, led to changes in the uprating 
procedures for taxes in a number of countries. In the UK, with price inflation 
running at 16 per cent, a backbench amendment by Rooker and Wise succeeded in 
introducing indexation of personal income tax allowances and tax bands. This has 
been in place since 1977. The US legislated in 1981 for indexation in line with price 
inflation with effect from 1985. These procedures are still in force. In Germany, the 
government has an obligation to report to parliament on the extent of ‘bracket 
creep’ (measured with respect to price inflation) every two years, but there is no 
obligation to adjust brackets (Dorn et al., 2017). These appear to be ‘one-off’ 
changes in uprating practice, but not all variations over time are of this type. 
The extent to which indexation or uprating policy can vary over time is 
well illustrated by the case of the UK’s Basic State Pension (BSP). As shown in 
Table 2, over the years between 1974 and 2011, policy moved from having 
no systematic uprating rule to one that adopted the higher of wage growth or 
price inflation, followed by more than 20 years based purely on price inflation. 
Currently the system provides for a ‘triple lock’, with pensions being uprated by 
the highest of earnings growth, price inflation or 2.5 per cent. 
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TABLE 2 UPRATING POLICY FOR UK BASIC STATE PENSION, 1948–2019 
Period Uprating policy 
1948–1974 Yearly decisions, no uprating rule 
1975–1980 Higher of wage growth and price inflation 
1980–2002 Price inflation 
2003–2010 Higher of 2.5% and price inflation 
2011– ‘Triple lock’: highest of earnings growth, price inflation or 2.5% 
 
Source:  Bozio et al. (2010). 
 
2.3 Variation across benefits 
We have noted already that many countries have different uprating procedures for 
pension benefits as against all other benefits. There can, however, be further 
differences even within the pensions sphere, with different practices operating on 
means-tested as against insurance-based benefits for example. Disney (2016) 
notes that four different uprating systems are in use in the UK for different 
elements of the pension system: 
When the ‘triple lock’ was introduced in 2010, it applied to the then Basic State 
Pension (BSP). The Additional State Pension (ASP) was to continue to be indexed 
to the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Hence the BSP component would likely grow 
faster than the ASP. Confusingly, too, the Minimum Guarantee to the Pension 
Credit would continue to be uprated in line with earnings, whilst the Saving Credit 
component of the Pension Credit could be uprated ‘as the Secretary of State sees 
fit.   
2.4 Implications of alternative indexation policies 
In order to understand the implications of different default options, we focus on 
three of the most commonly adopted defaults: non-indexation (leaving money-
valued parameters at the same nominal level), indexation in line with price 
inflation, and indexation in line with a measure of growth in earnings or incomes.7 
Indexation is applied (or not) to money-valued parameters such as tax credits, tax 
bands and welfare payment rates. We explore the implications of implementing 
each of these options on incomes at different levels across the full income 
distribution, using SWITCH,8 the ESRI tax-benefit model, to ensure that a nationally 
representative picture is obtained. We also examine the impact on the Exchequer 
balance – the extent to which it moves towards surplus or towards deficit. 
In order to explore the impact of implementing various default policies, we 
construct a basic economic scenario which includes key features of long-run 
                                                          
7  The focus in this section is on direct taxes and the Local Property Tax; Section 4 considers issues relating to indirect 
taxes. 
8  See Box 1 for more information on SWITCH. 
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experience. Later, we consider some potential complications arising from short-
run variations from this long-run path. Over the long run, economic growth means 
that nominal incomes have risen at a faster rate than prices, so that real incomes 
have grown. Economic growth can involve dislocations and trends which result in 
changes in the household income distribution. We can get a clearer view of the 
impact of default policies’ impacts by constructing a scenario in which all market 
incomes9 rise at the same rate – we abstract from the challenges posed by rising 
market income inequality or factors reducing market income inequality. 
This scenario is one in which prices rise at 2 per cent per year, and incomes grow 
more rapidly than prices, so that there is also real income growth of 2 per cent. We 
consider outcomes after a period of five years, meaning that prices rise by close to 
10.5 per cent, and nominal incomes by almost 22 per cent. 
Currently, the Local Property Tax liabilities depend on valuations as of 2013. Latest 
indications (O’Halloran (2019), quoting An Taoiseach) are that a revaluation initially 
scheduled for 2019 will not now take place until 2020 at earliest, and that bands 
and rates will be reformed to ensure that any property tax changes would be 
‘modest’. In our analysis, we construct such a property tax change by applying a 
reduced rate of tax to higher property tax values, so that the aggregate property 
tax revenue represents the same proportion of household income in the end 
period (after five years of growth in incomes and higher growth in property values) 
as in the base period.10 This is a ‘middle path’ between recent practice – property 
tax bills being fixed by 2013 valuations – and the application of unchanged property 
tax rates to a higher property tax value.11 At a technical level, this approach also 
allows the construction of policy scenarios in which both income and property 
taxes rise in line with incomes, so that the aggregate tax to income ratio remains 
constant – a feature of a fiscally neutral scenario. 
The precise details of the numbers used for income growth and prices are not 
essential to our findings. The key feature is that real incomes grow over the long 
run. The patterns observed in terms of distributional changes, and the direction of 
the impact on the Exchequer balance, are the key outcomes. The scale of the 
impact will depend on the precise numbers, and on the number of years included 
in the analysis. We present results classified by deciles of household disposable 
income per adult equivalent, using the equivalence scale used by the CSO in the 
measurement of ‘at risk of poverty’ (AROP), i.e. 1 for the first adult in the 
household, 0.66 for other adults, and 0.33 for each child. Each decile contains 10% 
of households, ranked from the lowest incomes (bottom) to the highest incomes 
(top). 
9 Market income here is defined as including incomes from employment, self-employment, interest, dividends and rent, 
and occupational pensions in payment (but excluding State Contributory and Non-Contributory pensions). 
10 Note that while growth in property tax revenue would be linked to income growth, the structure of liabilities would 
still reflect property values rather than income. 
11 For more details on options for restructuring of the Local Property Tax see Thornhill (2015); for analysis of the impact 
of a revaluation on revenue see O’Connor and Lynch (2016) 
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Figure 1 shows the outcomes in this scenario if tax and welfare parameters are 
frozen in nominal terms. There are losses in real income for those with the lowest 
incomes, as the real value of unchanged welfare payments is eroded by inflation. 
At higher incomes, there are gains in real disposable incomes, of between 3 and 5 
per cent – well below the cumulative growth in real earnings of just over 10 per 
cent. There is therefore an increase in overall income inequality. The AROP rate 
(the proportion of the population with incomes below 60 per cent of median 
household income per adult equivalent) rises by almost 3 percentage points. The 
net Exchequer balance improves, by close to €9.8 billion per annum, as the tax to 
GNP ratio rises and the expenditure to GNP ratio falls. 
FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTIONAL CHANGES ARISING FROM NON-INDEXATION (NOMINAL FREEZE) 
Note:  The net effect is reported. Analysis over a period of five years with assumed real income growth of 2 per cent. 
Figure 2 illustrates the outcomes under the alternative of price indexation of tax 
and welfare parameters. There are gains in real income across the income 
distribution, with smaller gains for those on low incomes and larger gains for those 
in the upper half of the distribution. This pattern reflects the fact that welfare 
payments as a proportion of total income decline when moving from low income 
to high income deciles. With welfare payments frozen in real terms, and real gains 
in market incomes (employment and self-employment), this gives rise to the 
pattern shown. Even with the highest of these gains (just over 7 per cent for the 
top decile), gains are well below the rise of 10.4 per cent in real pre-tax incomes. 
Again, there is an increase in inequality, and the risk of poverty rises by 1.6 
percentage points. The tax to GNP ratio rises, and the expenditure to GNP ratio 
falls, with a saving to the Exchequer in the region of €5.7 billion per annum. 
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FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTIONAL CHANGES ARISING FROM PRICE INDEXATION OF TAX AND WELFARE 
PARAMETERS 
Note:  The net effect is reported. Analysis over a period of five years with assumed real income growth of 2 per cent. 
In Figure 3, by contrast, households’ real incomes increase at almost the same rate 
across the full income distribution. Incomes rise by just over 10 per cent on 
average, and for each income decile.12 As Paulus et al. (2019) state, this is ‘a fiscally 
neutral scenario’, with ‘a neutral treatment of households on benefit and those 
with earnings – if household market incomes were rising (falling) in real terms, 
households on benefit would gain (lose) in real terms’. There is no change in 
income inequality and the risk of poverty remains constant. The Exchequer gains 
by €1.6 billion per annum, reflecting simply the increase in scale of the economy. 
12 There are minor variations (from 10.2 to 10.4 per cent). These arise because of a variety of elements in the tax-benefit 
system that lead to liabilities or benefits not rising in line with income; for example, mortgage interest relief at source 
depends on the size of mortgages, which is influenced by house prices, and rent supplement/Housing Assistance 
Payment (HAP) may be influenced by developments in the rental market.  
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FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTIONAL CHANGES ARISING FROM MARKET INCOME INDEXATION OF TAX AND 
WELFARE PARAMETERS 
Note:  The net effect is reported. Analysis over a period of five years with assumed real income growth of 2 per cent. 
Real-world indexation schemes are often more complex than the simple, single 
uprating approaches examined here. But the trends identified in our analysis carry 
through in more complex cases. Sutherland et al. (2008) examine the impact of 
uprating benefits, tax credits and direct tax thresholds in line with the UK’s current 
policies for a period of 20 years. These involve widespread indexation in line with 
prices, with the basic state pension receiving a more favourable treatment (the 
highest of wage growth, price inflation or 2.5 per cent). They find a benefit to the 
public finances of up to 3.6 per cent of GDP. At the same time, the incomes of ‘a 
considerable part of the poorer non-pensioner population would fall behind those 
of the population as a whole … and relative poverty would rise’. Child poverty 
would almost double, from 18 per cent to 33 per cent. 
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Box 1: SWITCH, the ESRI’s tax-benefit model 
The SWITCH (Simulating Welfare and Income Tax Changes) model is based on a 
representative sample of the Irish population consisting of pooled data from the 
CSO’s Survey of Income and Living Conditions (SILC). SILC is an annual household 
survey conducted by the Central Statistics Office (CSO) in order to obtain 
information regarding the income and living conditions of Irish households. The 
SWITCH database consists of nearly 10,000 households. 
The sample of households used to construct the SWITCH database contains all 
households from the 2015 survey, and all additional households from the 
2014/2013 surveys that were not interviewed in 2015. This ensures that 
households in SILC are present only once in the SWITCH database. Basing the 
model on SILC means that it represents as fully as possible the great diversity of 
household circumstances relevant to tax and social welfare. 
The data are adjusted to be representative of the 2019 population in terms of 
income levels, unemployment rates, etc. Data weights ensure that income tax 
yields, social welfare expenditure and so on can be grossed up to population levels. 
The model can simulate the disposable income each family would obtain under a 
variety of income tax and social welfare policies, real or proposed. SWITCH can 
then be used to estimate the Exchequer impact of alternative policies as well as 
the distributional impact on households’ incomes (i.e. the percentage change in 
income by decile or family type due to the policy changes).  
The SWITCH model provides a detailed and accurate representation of almost all 
aspects of the personal tax and benefit system. Expenditure information is not 
available in the underlying SILC survey; nor does it does account for expenditure 
on public services, which, unlike cash transfers provided through the benefit 
system, are conceptually difficult to value and assign at a household level (O’Dea 
and Preston, 2014).  
3 WHAT IS THE BEST BENCHMARK AGAINST WHICH TO MEASURE THE 
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF POLICY? 
We can use the information presented in the previous section to illuminate 
another question: What benchmark should we use when evaluating the 
distributional impact of changes in tax and welfare policy?13 First, we consider 
whether the default policy chosen by government can play such a role. Then we 
examine each of the three standards examined earlier (nominal freeze, price 
indexation and wage or income indexation) as potential benchmarks for analysis 
of distributional impacts of budgetary policy. 
13 The total policy change here includes both the default policy and changes announced on Budget day. 
12 
Should we use the government’s default policy as a benchmark for examining 
distributional impact? This is the standard used in many Budget day documents in 
Ireland, where the default policy is, for the most part, to keep nominal tax and 
welfare parameters constant at the pre-existing level. But there are serious 
problems with this approach. Default policies can change over time – so the 
measured impact of government policy depends on what government chooses as 
its default policy. Governments could, therefore, manipulate the measured impact 
on this approach by their choice of default policy. 
An example may help to illustrate this. Suppose a government proposed an 
extreme measure such as abolishing the welfare system, or the income tax system, 
over its period of government. It could therefore declare its default policy to 
include abolition in equal steps over five years. If the default policy were used as 
the yardstick for assessment of policy changes, then the measured impact would 
be zero in each year. This reductio ad absurdum clearly demonstrates the 
conceptual flaws in the use of government-chosen default options as a yardstick 
for assessment of policy changes. Changes over time, and across benefits, mean 
that to build an evaluation approach based on governments’ default options is to 
build on shifting sands. Paulus et al. (2019) make a similar point, stressing that the 
choice of a benchmark policy ‘is not related to what governments aim to do, or 
actually do – the role of the benchmark index is to offer a yardstick against which 
to measure the progress of actual government policies, and each benchmark has a 
specific economic interpretation’ (emphasis in original). 
TABLE 3 IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARK POLICIES ON KEY INDICATORS 
Indexed in line with prices, or frozen in 
nominal terms 
Indexed in line with 
wages/incomes 
Government spending as 
share of national income 
Decrease Constant 
Income tax as % of national 
income 
Increase Constant 
Exchequer balance moves 
towards surplus (+) or deficit 
(−) 
Lower deficit/higher surplus Constant 
Distributional impact 
Increased inequality, greater rise in real 
income for high incomes than for low 
incomes 
Neutral, same rise in real 
income across all income 
deciles 
Increase/decrease in AROP 
rate 
Increase Constant 
Next we turn to the evaluation of the three approaches examined in Section 2: tax 
and welfare values that are unchanged in nominal terms, increased in line with 
price inflation, or increased in line with growth in a measure of wages or incomes. 
Table 3 summarises key features of each of these candidates for use as a 
benchmark. 
Given that one of our aims is to assess distributional outcomes, a key feature 
is that the nominal freeze and price indexation approaches are not neutral 
in distributional terms. Under the scenario used here, with nominal wages 
growing faster than prices, the frozen tax and welfare parameters, or indexing 
them in line with price inflation, involve an increase in inequality. Only the 
wage/income indexation approach provides a distributionally neutral outcome 
against which to measure the impact of policy choices. Similarly, in 
macroeconomic terms, only the wage/income indexed benchmark leads to 
neutrality in the sense of unchanged ratios of tax and expenditure to national 
income. 
Comparisons with a price-indexed policy can be of interest for other reasons – for 
example, to monitor the impact of policy developments on the real value 
of welfare benefits. But it must be recognised that a benchmark of ‘no change in 
real terms’ involves non-neutral outcomes for welfare recipients and taxpayers. 
Thus, for a more comprehensive analysis of the distributional impact of 
policy, it is essential to include analysis relative to a distributionally neutral 
benchmark, such as is provided by a wage- or income-indexed policy. 
Overall, this evidence provides a strong case for using wage/income indexation as 
the benchmark for evaluation of the distributional outcomes of the budget. 
A similar case was made by Callan et al. (2001) and underpins the 
regular assessments of distributional impacts of budgetary policy by the 
ESRI (most recently, Roantree et al. (2018)). 
It should be noted that our approach does not imply what government 
policy ‘ought to be’; it merely advocates measuring actual policy against a 
distributionally neutral policy. One can also measure against a benchmark of 
‘constant real values’, but it must be realised that this involves 
distributional changes. Actual distributional targets are a matter for societal 
and governmental decision: our analysis is designed to provide clearer 
information on the consequences of alternative decisions. 
3.1 What has happened in practice? 
Default policies can influence eventual outcomes. The potential for ‘fiscal 
drag’ may make it easier for governments to make choices that increase tax 
rates and reduce benefits relative to other incomes. But default policies do not 
determine the outcomes – discretionary changes can override the defaults to 
arrive at any preferred outcome. Sutherland et al. (2008) note that countries 
with statutory indexation can sometimes suspend this default policy, while 
‘regular adjustments might be applied in countries where there is no statutory 
provision for automatic indexation as part of the budget process (in Ireland, 
Germany and New Zealand, for example)’. 
Paulus et al. (2019) examine the total impact of policy changes in a selection of 
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countries, with differing uprating regimes. The full period examined is 2001 to 
2011, which includes the strong growth of 2001 to 2007, and the recession/low-
growth period of 2007 to 2011. Their analysis includes the full period and the two 
sub-periods, and we summarise the key features of relevance to the present paper 
below.14 
Table 4 examines the impact of policy changes (including both default options and 
discretionary changes over and above the defaults) on income inequality as 
measured by the Gini coefficient for disposable income. While some of the 
countries examined have automatic indexation with respect to prices, none has 
systematic uprating with respect to nominal wage growth. Thus, where real wage 
growth is positive, regular adoption of automatic uprating as final policy would lead 
to increased inequality, as examined in Section 2. However, Paulus et al. find that 
over the full period, five of the seven countries examined saw policy changes that 
reduced inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. In three cases (Belgium, 
Greece and Italy) real wages were roughly constant – in these cases price 
indexation would have sufficed to ensure stability of income inequality. But the 
outcomes in these cases show reductions in income inequality. Of the other four 
cases, two (Estonia and the UK) show reductions in inequality and two (Bulgaria 
and Hungary) show increases in income inequality. 
TABLE 4 IMPACT OF POLICY CHANGES ON INCOME INEQUALITY INDICATOR, SELECTED EU 
COUNTRIES, 2001–2011 
Country Change in Gini coefficient 
(% points) 
Real growth in market 
Income, 2001–2011 (%) 
2001–2007 2007–2011 2001–2011 
Belgium 0.2* −0.8* −0.6* 0 
Bulgaria 0.6* 0.9* 1.4* 61 
Estonia −0.4* −0.6* −1.1* 57 
Greece 0 −0.6* −0.6* 1 
Hungary 0.1 2.2* 2.3* 14 
Italy −1.3* 0.2* −1.1* –3
UK −0.6* −0.7* −1.3* 11 
Source:  Paulus et al. (2019). 
Note: P values: * <0.01, † <0.05, ‡ <0.10. 
Table 5 shows results from a parallel analysis of policy impacts on the AROP rate. 
Over the full period, policy impacts in 6 of the 7 countries are found to be in the 
direction of reducing the risk of poverty. For Ireland, a longer run analysis is 
available from last year’s ESRI Budget Perspectives (Callan et al., 2018). This shows 
that, despite the absence of any formal indexation mechanism, regular uprating of 
14 We do not attempt a full interpretation of the results shown, which reflect a great many inter-country differences in 
terms of the composition of the population (e.g. share of the elderly, unemployment rate) and the make-up of the 
welfare system. 
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tax and welfare policies in the Budget, coupled with policy reforms, tended to 
reduce the risk of poverty by 1 percentage point. These results confirm the 
importance of the total impact of policy, rather than focusing simply on indexation 
mechanisms. For example, indexation in line with prices could lead to welfare 
payments falling relative to average earnings; but non-indexation, as in the Irish 
case, accompanied by regular discretionary changes can lead to welfare payments 
keeping pace with earnings. 
 
TABLE 5 IMPACT OF POLICY CHANGES ON AROP INDICATOR, SELECTED EU COUNTRIES, 
2001−2011 
Country Change in AROP (% points) Real growth in market  
income (2001−2011) 
 2001−2007 2007−2011 2001−2011  
Belgium 0.5‡ −2.1* −1.6* 0 
Bulgaria −0.9† 0.1 −0.8 61 
Estonia −2.0* −1.6* −3.6* 57 
Greece −0.2 −0.4‡ −0.6‡ 1 
Hungary 2.3* 0.6† 2.9* 14 
Italy −1.2* 0 −1.2* −3 
UK −3.0* −0.4* −3.4* 11 
 
Source:  Paulus et al. (2019). 
Note:  P values: * <0.01, † <0.05, ‡ <0.10. 
4 INDEXATION OF THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE – INDIRECT TAXES AND 
NON-CASH BENEFITS 
So far, this paper has considered the rationale and impact of indexation of the 
direct tax and cash benefit system. It is important, however, to consider indexation 
of the tax-benefit system as a whole.  
Indirect taxes either are calculated as a percentage of the price of a good or are 
charged by quantity at a nominal rate. The main indirect taxes in Ireland are Value 
Added Tax (VAT), which is levied on most goods and services on a percentage basis, 
and excise duties such as the tobacco products tax, alcohol products tax and the 
solid fuel carbon tax (SFCT), which are levied at a fixed rate per commodity unit. As 
discussed in Thirsk (1997), both direct and indirect taxes need to be indexed, 
particularly during periods of high inflation, in order to maintain real tax revenues 
and avoid distortions in the tax treatment of commodities and help avoid inflation-
induced inequities.  
Indirect taxes calculated as a percentage of the commodity price, such as VAT, will 
naturally rise as the price of the commodity rises. In the absence of indexation, 
indirect taxes calculated as a nominal amount per commodity unit will result in a 
real fall in such taxes as prices rise, a situation known as ‘fiscal boost’ – the opposite 
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to the ‘fiscal drag’ phenomenon discussed in Section 2. Therefore, while indexation 
of tax parameters and social welfare rates will cost the Exchequer, indexation of 
these indirect taxes will generate revenue. In order to keep these nominal indirect 
taxes at a constant rate relative to the commodity price, indexation of such taxes 
in line with prices would be a natural approach. The current default in the Irish 
system is no automatic adjustment in these nominal, indirect tax rates – rather ad 
hoc adjustments are announced on Budget day. 
The idea of indexation of the system as a whole is an important one. In the absence 
of indexation of the income limits for means tested non-cash benefits, fewer 
individuals will be eligible for such benefits as earnings and cash benefits rise. One 
such non-cash benefit is the General Medical Services (GMS) scheme, which 
awards Medical and GP-Visit Cards to families satisfying a means test.15 Indeed, a 
recent Parliamentary Question16 to the Minister for Health highlighted the issue of 
increasing State Pensions and the adverse effects this may have, with such 
increases sending some cardholders above the means limit. His response was: 
Budget 2019 provided for increases in a number of social welfare 
payments which are intended to come into effect in March 2019. It 
would be the Government’s intention that people’s ability to qualify 
for a medical card would not be adversely affected by this increase. I 
have asked the HSE [Health Service Executive] to monitor the situation 
and to advise me if it considers that changes in the rates of social 
welfare payments may affect people’s ability to qualify for a medical 
card. 
(Simon Harris TD, Minister for Health, 22 January 2019) 
IN FACT THE INCOME LIMITS FOR THE MEDICAL CARD HAVE REMAINED UNCHANGED SINCE 2006 
(SEE 
Table 6) while the income limits for the GP-Visit Card remained unchanged17 
between 2006 and 2019, when they were increased by 10%. Over this period wage 
growth was relatively modest (+4.3 per cent growth in average hourly regular 
earnings between 2008 and 201818), in large part due to a decline in earnings 
during the recession.  
15 Some Medical and GP-Visit Cards are awarded on a discretionary basis to individuals who have means above the 
relevant limit but are deemed to be at risk of undue hardship in the absence of the card. GP-Visit cards are also awarded 
to all individuals aged over 70 or under six. 
16 Available online at https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2019-01-22/319/  
17 Until 2019 income limits for GP-Visit cards were 50 per cent higher than those for Medical Cards. 
18 Taken from the CSO’s Earnings Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS). No data available for 2006/2007. 
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TABLE 6 MEDICAL CARD INCOME LIMITS, 2006−2019 
Category Aged under 66 
years (€) 
Aged over 66 
years (€) 
Single person living alone 184 201.50 
Single person living with family 164 173.50 
Couple, married/cohabiting/civil partners (or lone parent with 
dependent children) 
266.50 298 
Allowance for each of first two children aged under 16 38 38 
Allowance for third and each subsequent child under 16 41 41 
Allowance for each of first two children aged over 16 (with no 
income) 
39 39 
Allowance for third and each subsequent child over 16 (with no 
income) 
42.50 42.50 
Each dependant over 16 in full-time third-level education, who is 
not grant-aided 
78 78 
Note:  Weekly income limit (gross less tax, Universal Social Charge and PRSI) after childcare, housing and travel to work costs. 
Figure 4 shows the proportion of the population who hold a Medical Card. Despite 
the freezing of income limits from 2006 onwards, this proportion rose as the 
effects of the recession were felt, with a rise in unemployment and a fall in 
earnings19 occurring. Coverage rates fell from 40% in 2012 to 34% in 2017 as the 
economy and earnings recovered and unemployment rates fell.  
19 For example, average, regular earnings in the EHECS fell from €34,186 in 2009 to €33,174 in 2011. 
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FIGURE 4 MEDICAL CARD HOLDERS AS A PROPORTION OF THE POPULATION 
Source:  Number of Medical Card holders taken from the Primary Care Reimbursement Service annual statistical reports. Population 
coverage rate calculated using the number of Medical Card holders and CSO annual population estimates.  
A common indexation policy for cash and means-tested non-cash benefits would 
remove the need to monitor income levels mentioned above and would ensure 
that the number of eligible persons does not fall simply due to wage growth and 
indexation of other components the tax and welfare system.  
Similar consideration should be given to income limits for other non-cash benefits 
such the Affordable Childcare Scheme, which provides mainly means-tested 
childcare subsidies to parents via childcare providers. Likewise, income limits for 
Rent Supplement and Differential Rents for Local Authority properties and the HAP 
would need to be indexed in line with incomes to ensure that increases in earnings 
and welfare payments do not continually result in higher rent payments for those 
in receipt of these benefits.  
5 SELECTED ISSUES IN WELFARE INDEXATION 
Discussion of indexation policy for welfare payments in Ireland has centred mainly 
on the State Contributory pension. One of the earliest statements in this regard 
was from the Pensions Board (1998): 
Having considered the issues raised in relation to both adequacy and 
coverage, recognising that both the level of pension and the approach 
to indexation need to be borne in mind, and conscious of the fact that 
there is no ‘right answer’ about a rate which could be objectively 
agreed, the Board considers that the best strategy in order to, firstly, 
minimise the risk of poverty and, secondly, provide coverage to lower 
income people in the most efficient way is to set the target pension 
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rate at the upper end of the range estimated by the ESRI i.e. £96 per 
week (in 1996 terms). For reasons of practicality, the Board considers 
that this target should be expressed as a percentage of average 
industrial earnings which would equate to around 34 per cent, which 
seems a ‘reasonable’ percentage in terms of what a minimum income 
should be. 
This target has been referred to widely in subsequent years, and was restated most 
recently in the ‘Pensions Roadmap’ (Government of Ireland, 2018): 
In order to protect pension adequacy into the future the Government 
intends to examine and develop proposals to:  
(i) Set a formal benchmark target of 34% of average earnings for
State pension contributory payments and;
(ii) Institute a process whereby future changes in pension rates of
payment are explicitly linked to changes in the consumer price
index and average wages.
However ‘locking-in’ pension increases in a formulaic manner may 
limit discretion to implement other policy priorities in an environment 
where fiscal space is limited. Accordingly the development of such 
approaches will require careful design and could only be introduced if 
accompanied by complementary changes in the funding of the pension 
system. 
There has been some discussion of indexation policy for other welfare payments. 
Kennedy (2001) looked at the issue of indexation but the Working Group 
established at the time failed to reach a consensus. NESC (1999) states: 
In conclusion, the Council is of the view that, in the longer term, 
poverty for some categories of the population will increase if social 
welfare rates do not match increases in average disposable incomes. 
In view of this, social welfare rates must be linked to improvements in 
the general standard of living. 
This suggests a rather similar mechanism for indexation of all welfare payments. 
Absent such an approach, the ratio of payments for pensions to that of other 
welfare rates may vary substantially. This is illustrated by experience over almost 
four decades in Table 7. 
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TABLE 7  PAYMENT RATES FOR JOBSEEKER’S BENEFIT AND STATE CONTRIBUTORY PENSION, 
SELECTED YEARS, 1982−2019 
 Jobseeker’s Benefit (€/week) State Contributory Pension (€/week) ‘Pensioner premium’ (%) 
1982 40.19 51.11 27.2 
1987 53.71 69.96 30.3 
1994 77.45 90.15 16.4 
2000 98.40 121.89 23.9 
2007 185.80 209.30 12.6 
2014 188.00 230.30 22.5 
2019 203.00 248.30 22.3 
 
Source:  http://www.welfare.ie/en/Pages/SW19-Archive.aspx  
Note:  Rates of payment for 2000 and earlier years converted from Irish pound to euro. Current nominal values are used 
throughout, as the focus is on the ratio of the payment rates. The ‘pensioner premium’ is the percentage by which the SCP 
rate exceeds the JB rate. 
 
The ‘pensioner premium’ has oscillated between a high of 30 per cent in 1987 and 
a low of 13 per cent in 2007, stabilising at around 22 per cent in 2019. It is difficult 
to rationalise such a pattern in terms of social inclusion goals. 
Finally we turn to consideration of cyclical issues. While typically wages rise by 
more than prices, there are cyclical variations in both of these indices, and at times 
indexation with respect to real wages would imply falls in real incomes for welfare 
recipients. Figure 5 shows how real wages fell sharply during the recent 
recessionary years, then recovered gradually to pre-recession levels. 
 
FIGURE 5 INDEX OF REAL AVERAGE EARNINGS, 2008−2017 
 
 
 
Is it possible to ‘smooth’ the path of welfare payments when average incomes are 
falling? This depends partly on the public finance situation. It may also result in 
indexation leading to ‘ratcheting’, whereby welfare payments rise at a faster rate 
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than both wages and prices in the long run.20 Welfare payments must on average 
follow the real income path of average incomes, so if protected during downturn, 
they must be less than the full extent of growth in upturns to avoid a ratcheting 
effect. An alternative that prevents ratcheting is the ‘smoothed earnings approach’ 
whereby benefits are indexed in line with wage inflation unless price inflation is 
higher, in which case benefits are indexed in line with prices. In subsequent years, 
where wage growth again exceeds price inflation, welfare rates continue to be 
indexed in line with price inflation until such time as the earnings benchmark is 
once again restored. Particular care needs to be taken to distinguish between 
cyclical falls and shifts in long-term trends – potential adjustment paths differ for 
these. 
6 THE COST AND DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF INDEXATION CHOICES: 
BUDGET 2020 
Finally, we examine the cost of indexing direct income taxes,21, benefits and 
indirect nominal taxes, specifically excise duties and carbon taxes. We also examine 
the distributional impact that would occur if Budget 2020 were to keep taxes and 
benefit parameters frozen in nominal terms.  
SWITCH (see Box 1) is firstly used to calculate households’ direct tax liabilities and 
benefit entitlements under the actual 2019 tax and benefit system. Two 
counterfactual income distributions are then produced. Under the first, the 2019 
tax-benefit system is indexed by anticipated price inflation for 2020, i.e. direct tax 
thresholds/credits and welfare benefits are increased in line with the forecasted 
growth in prices. Under the second counterfactual, the 2019 tax-benefit system is 
indexed by anticipated wage inflation for 2020, i.e. tax thresholds/credits and 
welfare benefits are increased in line with the forecasted growth in wages. Price 
inflation is forecast at +1.4% for 2020 while wage inflation is forecast to be +3.5%.22  
Given that expenditure information is not available in the data underpinning 
SWITCH, the Household Budget Survey (HBS) is used to estimate the indirect taxes 
paid by households (including VAT, duties and carbon taxes) under announced 
2019 rates. One counterfactual 2020 indirect tax system is produced whereby 
nominal indirect taxes are increased in line with price inflation estimates – as price 
inflation is the natural indexation choice for indirect taxes, as discussed earlier.  
                                                          
20  This point was recognised by NESC (1999), who argued that ‘Indexation to the higher of inflation or incomes ... creates 
a “ratchet effect”, which means that over a long timeframe SW rates would grow faster than either incomes or inflation. 
While this could be legitimate during the period of achievement of an agreed benchmark it would not be legitimate or 
feasible in the long-term.’  
21  By ‘income taxes’ here we mean charges on income such as income tax, USC and PRSI. 
22  Price and wage inflation for 2020 are calculated using the average of the ESRI’s Quarterly Economic Commentary (QEC) 
forecast and the Central Bank’s Quarterly Bulletin forecast. Both McQuinn et al. (2019) and Central Bank of Ireland 
(2019) forecast a CPI of +1.4% in 2020. QEC (2019) forecasts a 3.5% growth in average hourly earnings while Central 
Bank of Ireland (2019) forecasts +3.6% for compensation per employee.  
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Table 8 shows the net cost of indexing the tax and welfare23 system in 2020. 
Indexation of the direct tax and benefit system by price indexation would cost just 
under €500m while price indexation of the indirect tax system would generate 
nearly €38m, giving a net Exchequer cost of indexation of €462m. Meanwhile, 
wage indexation of the direct tax and benefit system by price indexation would 
cost nearly €1.3 billion. The cost of price indexation of the indirect tax system 
remains at €38m, giving a net Exchequer cost of indexation of €1.2 billion. These 
costs can be put into perspective by comparing them to the fiscal space that was 
available last year − IFAC (2018) estimated a gross fiscal space of €3.9 billion for 
Budget 2019, with non-indexation of the tax system bringing this figure to €4.5 
billion.  
 
TABLE 8 EXCHEQUER IMPACT, INDEXATION 
  CPI indexation; 
direct/indirect taxes 
& benefits (€m p.a.) 
Wage indexation; direct 
taxes/benefits. CPI 
indexation: indirect 
taxes (€m p.a.) 
Indexation Exchequer cost, direct taxes/benefits 499.8 1,265.9 
Indexation Exchequer gain, indirect taxes 37.8 37.8 
Net Exchequer cost of indexation 462.0 1,228.0 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015−2016 Household Budget Survey and SWITCH run on pooled 2013/2014/2015 Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions data, both uprated to 2019 incomes and prices.  
 
While indexation of direct tax and benefits would be significantly more costly than 
price indexation, Figure 3 demonstrates that doing so ensures a neutral treatment 
of households on benefits and those with earnings and results in a ‘fiscally neutral 
scenario’ over the longer run. This compares to a price indexation of direct taxes 
and benefits that is less costly but leads to larger gains for higher income 
households and relatively lower gains for lower income households over the longer 
run, as shown in Figure 2.  
A more obvious approach for the indexation of indirect taxes is apparent – indexing 
these taxes in line with prices would keep these taxes constant in real terms while 
there is no clear rationale for indexing indirect taxes in line with wages. For these 
reasons we present the distributional impact of both price and wage indexation of 
indirect taxes and benefits along with the price indexation of indirect taxes.  
To do so we examine the distributional impact that would occur in 2020 if the direct 
tax-benefit and indirect tax systems were indexed in line with price inflation. We 
then compare this with the income distribution that would be in place if tax 
                                                          
23  This includes personal rates payments along with increases for qualified adults/children and additional allowances such 
as the living alone allowance. 
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parameters (both direct and indirect) and benefit rates were frozen in nominal 
terms. Figure 6 shows the differences in these two income distributions.  
A lack of indexation of direct tax-benefit system in line with price inflation would 
result in a regressive pattern with the lowest income decile losing out the most 
(−0.9%) and the highest income decile losing out the least (−0.3%). Non-indexation 
of the indirect tax system in line with prices would result in a progressive pattern 
with the largest gain for the lowest income decile (+0.09%) and the smallest gain 
(+0.02%) for the highest income decile. The negative impact on income of not 
indexing the direct tax-benefit system in line with prices, however, more than 
outweighs the gains faced by the lower income deciles due to non-indexation of 
indirect taxes. Overall, therefore, the net impact remains regressive, with larger 
losses for lower income households (−0.8% of income compared to −0.3% for the 
highest income decile).  
 
FIGURE 6  DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF NON-INDEXATION IN LINE WITH PRICE INFLATION 
(DIRECT/INDIRECT TAXES AND BENEFITS): % CHANGE IN DISPOSABLE INCOME 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015–2016 Household Budget Survey, and SWITCH run on pooled 2013/2014/2015 Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions data, both uprated to 2019 incomes and prices.  
Note:   Deciles are based on equivalised household income, using CSO national equivalence scales. 
Next we examine the distributional impact that would occur in 2020 if the direct 
tax-benefit system was not indexed in line with anticipated wage inflation. We 
continue to assume that the indirect taxation system is not indexed in line with 
price inflation for reasons discussed above. We compare this income distribution 
to the one that would be in place if tax parameters (both direct and indirect) and 
benefit rates were frozen in nominal terms. Figure 7 shows the differences in these 
two income distributions.  
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FIGURE 7 DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF NON-INDEXATION IN LINE WITH WAGE INFLATION 
(DIRECT TAXES AND BENEFITS) AND PRICE INFLATION (INDIRECT TAXES): % CHANGE IN 
DISPOSABLE INCOME 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations using the 2015−2016 Household Budget Survey, and SWITCH run on pooled 2013/2014/2015 Survey of 
Income and Living Conditions data, both uprated to 2019 incomes and prices.  
Note:  Deciles are based on equivalised household income, using CSO national equivalence scales. 
 
Overall, the same pattern as seen in Figure 6 is observed but the regressive nature 
of not indexing the direct tax-benefit system by wage inflation is substantially 
stronger, with the lowest income decile losing out the most (−2.3%) and the highest 
income decile losing out the least (−0.8%). The results of not indexing the indirect 
tax system in line with prices are as before. As before, the net impact remains 
regressive, with larger losses for lower income households (−2.2% of income 
compared to −0.8% for the highest income decile). 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the issue of indexation, whereby governments may 
increase tax bands, credits and social transfers in line with price or earnings 
inflation. It is apparent that there is wide variation in the default chosen by 
governments across time and across countries and further variation across 
different elements of the tax-benefit system.  
The implications of three commonly used indexation approaches were examined − 
non-indexation (i.e. leaving money valued parameters frozen at the same nominal 
level), indexation in line with price inflation, and indexation in line with earnings 
growth. Over the longer run, assuming real growth in incomes ahead of price 
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inflation, indexation of tax and welfare parameters in line with earnings growth 
will result in household real incomes rising at close to the same rate across the 
income distribution, regardless of whether the income is from earnings or social 
welfare. This will result in little or no change in income inequality and AROP rates. 
Indexation in line with price inflation, which tends to be lower than earnings, 
results in a rise in real income across the income distribution but gains are larger 
for those at the upper end of the income distribution and smaller for those at the 
lower end. Non-indexation results in a more regressive pattern, with losses in real 
income for those at the lower end of the income distribution as inflation erodes 
the real value of benefit payments, while those on higher incomes receive an 
increase in real income as earnings growth outstrips price inflation. Both price and 
non-indexation will result in increased income inequality and poverty rates.  
From an Exchequer point of view, tax and expenditure to GNP ratios will remain 
constant if indexation in line with earnings is adopted. Both indexation in line with 
prices and non-indexation will result in a rise in the tax and expenditure to GNP 
ratios as the government gains from a freeze, or increase less than wage inflation, 
in tax credits, bands and social welfare benefits. Therefore, in evaluating the 
impact of tax-benefit policy over time, the use of wage-indexed policy parameters 
has a strong claim on our attention – it results in a fiscally neutral situation over 
time and provides us with a neutral benchmark against which to assess actual 
policy changes. 
 In practice in Ireland, in the absence of a formal indexation process, discretionary 
changes in tax bands/credits and welfare payments in recent decades have tended 
to keep pace with earnings growth, resulting in relatively constant poverty rates.  
While this paper has mainly focused on the direct tax system (e.g. income taxes, 
USC, PRSI) and cash welfare benefits, it is also important to consider the tax-benefit 
system as a whole. Without price indexation, indirect taxes set at a fixed rate per 
unit of a commodity, such as excise duties and the carbon tax, will fall in real terms 
over time if not adjusted. Increases in these indirect taxes in line with price inflation 
is an obvious choice in order to maintain their real value over time. Non-cash 
benefits are also of importance – unless income levels in means tests for non-cash 
benefits, such as Medical and GP-Visit cards, childcare and housing subsidies are 
adjusted in line with earnings inflation, entitlements to such benefits will fall over 
time as a lower proportion of individuals will satisfy the means test. Consistent 
approaches across cash benefits would also be required in order to maintain the 
relative value of different benefits. Consideration must also be given to how 
benefits should be indexed in times of falling prices or wages and to being 
conscious of potential ratcheting effects over time, depending on the indexation 
approach adopted.  
Finally, the cost and distributional impacts of price and wage indexation were 
examined in the content of Budget 2020. Non-indexation of the tax-benefit system 
would result in losses in income across the income distribution, with sharper 
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effects for non-indexation in line with wages when compared to prices. Assuming 
indexation of indirect taxes in line with prices, price indexation of direct tax and 
welfare parameters would cost in the region of €462 million and wage indexation 
would cost around €1.2 billion. These costs need to be examined in light of the 
actual fiscal space available and, ultimately, remain a political decision.  
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